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by Julie E. Nelson and Alan M. Schroder
Her silent gaze is fixed on the northern portion of the city, and her cold granite eyes stare at the passing motorists. She seems 
pensive, as if seeing a vision of the pain of 
dealing with an irreparable loss. The inscrip­
tion on the granite memorial reads:
Iowa, her affections, like the rivers of her 
borders, flow to an inseparable union.
She is one of the figures on a 135-foot monu­
ment erected in Des Moines to commemorate 
the people who gave up their lives in America’s 
Civil War. Constructed from 1,840 tons of 
granite, the monument stands as a tangible 
tribute, the inscription reads, “to the courage, 
patriotism, and distinguished service of all her 
soldiers and sailors who fought in the war of 
rebellion, 1861-1865.”
W hen President Abraham Lincoln issued his 
first call for troops for the Union army, three 
days after the South fired on Fort Sumter, he 
set one regiment as the quota for Iowa. Gover­
nor Samuel J. Kirkwood was uncertain that he 
could raise the thousand men needed to fill this 
quota, but he did issue a proclamation warning 
Iowans that The Nation is in peril. A fearful 
attempt is being made to overthrow the Consti­
tution and dissever the Union. The aid of everv
✓
loyal citizen is invoked to sustain the General 
Government. For the honor of our State let the 
requirement of the President be cheerfully and 
promptly met.’ Iowa’s response flu* exceeded 
Kirkwood’s hopes. The Iowa quota was filled by 
volunteers in the first day of recruiting, and the 
governor had to begin turning away offers of 
additional locally-formed companies.
With the enthusiasm for the Union cause at 
its peak, Kirkwood’s real problem was in 
providing the material to supply and equip the
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Iowa volunteer regiments. Troops were re­
cruited at stations throughout Iowa, then col­
lected in camps at D ubuque, Iowa City, 
Davenport, Burlington, and Keokuk. At the 
camps, they had to be fed, provided with uni­
forms, weapons, and equipment, and given 
some rudimentary military training. Food 
could be supplied from sources within the 
state, but cloth for uniforms was in short sup­
ply. Governor Kirkwood was forced to con­
clude that the state could provide the same 
uniforms for everyone in a company, but that 
not all the companies in a given regiment could 
be clothed alike. The same situation existed 
throughout the Northern states early in the 
war, so the Union forces marched off to war in a 
rainbow of uniforms. The dark blue uniforms so 
closely associated with the Union cause were 
not generally adopted until after the battle of 
Bull Run, when some Union troops fired on 
other gray-clad Union regiments.
Weapons to arm the Iowa regiments were in 
similarly short supply early in the war. Muskets 
that were supposed to have been held for them 
at the federal arsenal in St. Louis were sent 
elsewhere, and when a shipment of 2,000 fi­
nally did arrive they were described by Franc 
Wilkie of the Dubuque Herald as “more 
dangerous to friend than enemy—[they] will 
kick further than they shoot, and are appropri­
ately known from their awkward peculiarities 
in this and other respects, among our Germans 
as Kuh-fuss— cow-foot.’ Eventually, the
Iowa troops raised in these early days of the war 
in 1861 were provided with some kind of uni­
form, a weapon of sorts, and just a bit of training 
and then sent downriver by steamboat to St. 
Louis. There they were reassigned to the latest 
point of confrontation between the Northern 
and Southern armies or to more peaceful rear
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areas for garrison duty.
Over the course of the war, Iowa raised be­
tween 72,000 and 76,000 troops, counting en­
listments and re-enlistments. Iowans filled 
forty-six infantry regiments, four companies of 
light artillery, and nine cavalry regiments, and 
black Iowans provided the basis for a black 
infantry regiment. Most enlistments were for 
th ree years.
Though the most prominent battles in the Civil War were those in the East—like 
Gettysburg, Antietam, and Fredericksburg— 
that were part of the struggle for the two capi­
tals of Washington and Richmond, the battles 
of the western theatre were at least as impor­
tant as factors in the Northern victory. These 
were the battles that secured the border states 
for the North and that eventually split the 
South in two and seriously damaged the eco­
nomic base the South needed to support its 
military effort. Nearly all the troops Iowa sent 
to war were directed to the western theatre.
When the war began in April 1861, the alle­
giance of the border states was very much in 
doubt. I hough a Missouri state convention 
favored the North, for example, the gover­
nor—Claiborne Jackson—sought to obtain the 
state s secession from the Union. To secure the 
state, most of the Iowa regiments raised in the 
early months of the war were sent first to Ben­
ton Barracks in St. Louis, then distributed
throughout the northern Missouri counties to 
guard key communications points and rail 
lines. To strike at a concentration of Missouri 
Confederates being collected south of Spring- 
field by General Sterling Price, Union Briga­
dier General Nathaniel Lyon moved out of 
Springfield on August 9 with a force of 5,800 
troops from Missouri, Kansas, and Iowa. At the 
battle of Wilson’s Creek on the following day, 
Lyon split his force and saw both halves de­
feated in turn. He retreated to Springfield with 
a loss of a thousand casualties. The following 
spring, however, the Northern forces—now 
under the command of Brigadier General 
Samuel R. Curtis of Keokuk—pushed the 
Southern forces commanded by Major General 
Earl Van Dorn out of Missouri and into Arkan­
sas. Van Dorn was defeated at the battle of Pea 
Ridge, and the threat of Missouri’s secession 
came to an end.
F arther east, the ultimate control of the key border state of Kentucky was also in doubt 
that spring of 1862. For the South, Kentucky 
meant a buffer against the Northern drive to 
split the Confederacy in two. For the North, 
control of Kentucky meant protection of the 
essential transportation routes of the Ohio 
River Valley and of the cities in southern Illi­
nois, Indiana, and Ohio. Striking against the 
Southern line that ran through central Ken­
tucky from Bowling Green in the east to
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Recruits for the Iowa regiments were collected at military camps like this one, Camp Henderson, at 
Dubuque. (SHSI)
The Palimpsest 101
Ft. Donelson 
Feb. 16, 1862
Chattanooga 
Nov. 23-25, 1863
Atlanta 
Sept. 2, 1864
Savannah 
Dec. 21, 1864Vicksburg
Nov. 1862-July 4, 1863
Mobile 
Apr. 1 2, 1865
Wilson's Creek 
August 10, 1861
*
T
Pea Ridge 
Mar. 6-8, 1862
Ft. Henry 
Feb. 6, 1862
Shiloh
Apr. 6-7, 1862 g.
TT
Corinth
Oct. 3-4, 1862
Sabine Crossroads 
Apr. 8, 1 864
As this map shows, Iowa troops were mainly involved in the Civil War campaigns to secure the border state 
of Missouri, to cut the South in two by gaining control of the Mississippi, and then to push eastward to the 
sea to starve the remaining Confederate armies by destroying the economic base on which they depended.
Columbus on the Mississippi River, a relatively 
unknown Union general— Ulysses S. 
Grant—moved up the Cumberland and Ten­
nessee rivers with a force of 17,000 troops that 
included four Iowa regiments. His goal was the 
capture of Forts Henry and Donelson just 
across the border in Tennessee. Fort Henry, 
which was very poorly located, fell easily on 
February 6, 1862, and the Second Iowa led in 
the assault on Fort Donelson that produced a 
Confederate surrender on February 16. When 
the Southern commander requested Grant s 
terms, his famous reply was: “No terms except 
an unconditional and immediate surrender can 
be accepted. I propose to move immediately 
upon your works. With his success at Forts 
Henry and Donelson, Grant s star began to 
rise, and he gained the nickname “Uncondi­
tional Surrender Grant’ that remained with 
him in his eventual command of all the North­
ern armies.
Apart from securing western Kentucky, the 
Northern victories in February also began the 
inexorable Union march southward to split the 
Confederacy and gain uninterrupted control of 
the Mississippi River. As Grant continued 
southward, Confederate General Albert Sid­
ney Johnston concentrated a force of 40,000 
troops at Corinth, Mississippi, and on April 6 
attacked Grant’s force of an equal size that was 
milling around Pittsburg Landing twenty 
miles north in Tennessee. In the resulting bat­
tle of Shiloh, one of the bloodiest battles of the 
war, Johnston’s surprise attack gained him an 
initial success. Rut a stubborn defense of the 
Northern center by the Eighth, Twelfth, and 
Fourteenth Iowa regiments and the Fifty- 
eighth Illinois under General Benjamin M. 
Prentiss in the area that came to be known as 
the Hornet s Nest bought Grant enough time
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to organize a defense on the first day of the 
battle and an offensive on the second day that 
drove the Confederates back to Corinth at a 
cost of half of Johnston’s troops.
Grant rested his army at Shiloh for three 
weeks and then, reinforced by General John 
Pope after his successes along the Mississippi at 
Island Number 10 and at Memphis, he moved 
slowly southward to Corinth, which had been 
evacuated by Johnston. The invading force that 
had been collected for this drive southward was 
now broken up, with the Army of the Ohio and 
two divisions of the Army of the Mississippi 
sent to reinforce the Union forces that had been 
bottled up at Chattanooga in eastern Ten­
nessee after their defeat at the battle of 
Chickamauga. General Halleck was ordered to 
\\ ashington to become the general-in-chief of 
the Union armies, leaving Grant in command 
in the west. Corinth was a key rail center for the 
South, and Grant expected an attack as he set­
tled in for the summer. The attack finally came 
on October 3, but in one of the most violent 
battles of the war, the Southern forces were 
eventually forced to retreat, leaving Corinth 
securely in Northern hands. Pope’s earlier vic­
tories along the Mississippi and the seizure of 
New Orleans by David Farragut and his gun­
boats in April 1862 left only Vicksburg and
Natchez as Southern strongpoints on the all- 
important river.
Unlike the two- or three-day battles that had preceded it, the campaign for Vicks­
burg was an eight-month struggle of maneuver 
and siege. The four army corps that Grant 
brought on the campaign included twenty- 
eight infantry regiments, two artillery regi­
ments and two cavalry regiments from Iowa,
and they played an important role in the opera­
tions that cut off \  icksburg from supply and 
reinforcement and allowed Grant to settle in 
for a siege. Finally, on July 3, 1863, the Con­
federate force, which was by then faced with 
starvation, surrendered.
With the fall of Vicksburg, the Northern goal 
of sp litting  the C onfederacy had been 
achieved. With the North in control of the 
Mississippi, Robert E. Lee’s armies in the East 
could no longer expect troops or agricultural 
commodities to flow eastward from beyond the 
Mississippi. Much of the lifeblood of the 
Southern war effort had been cut off; the turn­
ing point of the war had been marked.
The fighting continued, of course. At Chat­tanooga, the Iowa troops who had been 
sent from C orinth found them selves en­
trenched at the bottom of an amphitheater with 
the Confederates under Braxton Bragg staring 
down at them from the heights of Lookout 
Mountain and Missionary Ridge. Encouraged 
to break out of the position as fast as possible in 
order to relieve Ambrose Burnside, who was in 
a similar position in Nashville, Grant decided 
on a frontal assault on the Southern positions. 
On the first day of battle, November 24, 1863, 
the Northern attack led to a Southern evacua­
tion of Lookout Mountain, and the second day s 
assault up the steep slopes of Missionary Ridge 
produced a general Southern retreat that left 
Chattanooga secure and allowed Sherman to 
relieve Nashville.
Grant’s successes in the western theatre led 
President Lincoln to appoint him general-in- 
chief of the Union armies in February 1864. 
When he left for Washington, Grant left Sher­
man in charge of the forces at Chattanooga with 
orders to destroy General Joseph E. Johnston s
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The Hornet's Nest at Shiloh, where three Iowa 
regiments and an Illinois regiment held the
Union center long enough to give Grant time to 
organize a defense against the Confederate
attack. (SHSI)
army and move into the interior of the South, 
which Sherman interpreted to mean capturing 
Atlanta. He began his advance southeast in 
May with the Army of the Tennessee, the Army 
of the Cumberland, and the Army of the Ohio, 
a total of 90,000 men. The Iowa troops on 
Sherman s march were concentrated in the 
Army of the Tennessee, which included eigh­
teen infantry, two cavalry, and one artillery 
regiment from Iowa.
Sherman moved slowly forward through 
May and June, carefully avoiding any major 
engagement that would divert his course from 
Atlanta. He reached the city on June 19 and 
began to encircle it with entrenchments. Gen­
eral John B. Hood, who had replaced Johnston, 
was in danger of being trapped in a besieged 
city, just as the Confederate forces at Vicksburg 
had been, but he evacuated his troops from the 
city before Sherman s encirclement was com­
pleted. Sherman entered Atlanta on Septem­
ber 2, having achieved one of the goals set by 
Grant, but allowing Hood’s army to escape.
By now, the war was drawing to a close. 
Hood planned a march north into Tennessee 
that he hoped would draw7 Sherman away from 
his plans to attack Savannah or, failing that, to 
defeat Thomas at Nashville and then turn east
to join Lee in Virginia. All these plans were, 
however, only delaying actions to stave off de­
feat. Sherman was not particularly distressed 
by Hood’s movements, pausing only long 
enough in his plans to ensure that Thomas had 
sufficient reinforcements to stop any invasion 
of Tennessee and Kentucky. Along with the 
Iowa cavalry regiments already in Nashville, 
these included five Iowa regiments brought in 
from Missouri. By the time Hood reached 
Nashville on December 1, Thomas had col­
lected 55,000 troops to Hood’s 25,000. Hood’s 
army was defeated fairly easily in a battle that 
began on December 15, and in the retreat that 
followed it dissolved as an effective military 
force.
T he Iowa troops who had been in Sher­man’s Army of the Tennessee since Chat­
tanooga now set off again as part of his “March 
to the Sea. Leaving Atlanta with 62,000 troops 
in mid-November, Sherman met little opposi­
tion in what was essentially a punitive cam­
paign. His intention w7as to deal a final blow to 
Southern morale and, by cutting the rail lines 
to Virginia, to further weaken Lee’s desperate 
defense of Richmond.
Sherm an’s army reached Savannah on
December 22, in time to present it as a Christ­
mas gift to President Lincoln, then turned 
north on a campaign through the Carolinas. 
The remnants of the Confederate forces were 
placed under the command of Joseph Johnston, 
but they offered little resistance to Sherman s 
hardened troops. By the time Lee had been 
driven from Richmond to surrender at Appo­
mattox Courthouse, Sherman had reached 
Raleigh. After a period of negotiations and a 
truce, Johnston formally surrendered  on 
April 26.
\\  hile the most significant campaigns involv­
ing Iowa troops were farther east, a number of 
Iowa regiments were also assigned to duty in 
Arkansas and Louisiana after these states had 
been cut off from the remainder of the Confed­
eracy by Union control of the Mississippi.
I hese states were not a major focus of attention
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VI illiarn F. Coffman of the I hirtieth Iowa made this drawing of the Union victory at Lookout Mountain in
the battle of Chattanooga on the morning of Novemher 25,1863. Two days later he was wounded in battle. 
SHSI >
for the North, and Grant in particular only 
grudgingly assigned troops to the area. Several 
Iowa regiments were involved in the disastr­
ous Red River Campaign, a poorly planned and 
poorly executed operation into northwestern 
Louisiana in the winter and spring of 1864. Led 
by the political general Nathaniel Banks, the 
campaign came to an abrupt halt with a Union 
defeat at the battle of Sabine Crossroads. Late 
in the war, Iowa troops also participated in the 
successful campaign to seize Mobile, Alabama 
in April 1865, but by then the military signifi­
cance of the formerly very valuable port city 
had ended.
B y the time the fighting ground to a halt for the Iowa troops at Raleigh and Mobile, 
they could look back on four years of war that 
had cost the state 13,000 of its men. Fully 30
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Iowa casualties in medical facilities like this Mississippi River hospital boat were much more likely to 
be the victims of disease than of battle. (SHSI]
percent of all the Iovvans who had served in the 
Union army had been e ither killed or 
wounded, and more than twice as many of thej
deaths had come from disease as from battle 
injuries. The soldiers’ diet of bread, salt pork, 
and coffee had combined with the unsanitary 
conditions in military camps and hospitals to 
produce conditions that allowed diseases like 
typhoid fever, dysentery, consumption, and 
smallpox to spread rapidly through whole
regiments. The months of marching and sitting 
in camp proved far deadlier to the Iowa troops 
than the few days of battle that punctuated the 
monotony. From Wilson’s Creek through Pea 
Ridge, Forts Henry and Donelson, Shiloh, 
Corinth, Vicksburg, Chattanooga, Nashville, 
and Atlanta to the final days at Raleigh and 
Mobile, Iowa troops won the glory of fighting 
for the cause of the Union, but they paid the 
price as well. □
